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All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others.
Aldous Huxley, Animal Farm
Abstract
Many participants in the recent fierce debate on ritual slaughter in the Netherlands have 
understood this to be a conflict between religious and secular values, pitting religious freedom 
against animal welfare. The great variety in viewpoints among all groups involved, however 
– political parties, religious communities, scientists, the meat industry and engaged citizens – 
makes it impossible to describe any one standpoint as either religious or secular per se. Rather, 
the politicisation of this issue emerges out of politicisation of diversity in Dutch society more 
generally. Yet, another development is equally relevant: the growing, though still largely implicit, 
distinction being made between ‘involuntary’ minority identities based on biology (race, sex and 
sexuality) and ‘voluntary’ ones based on personal choice (religion and culture). This distinction 
is crucial for understanding the pressure being put today on the accommodation of religious 
difference when it is increasingly perceived as a form of voluntary difference from the norm. 
When this distinction between ‘congenital’ and ‘chosen’ minority difference is considered more 
closely, however, from the perspective of contemporary scientific research tracking religion in 
human neurology and evolution, it turns out to be largely untenable. Correspondingly, scientific 
expertise offers few, if any, solutions to the question of the place of religious truths in secular 
democracy, but only changes the terms under which they are politicised.
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1 A Night in Parliament
On the night of 22 June 2011, the Dutch House of Representatives debated until 
3:23 a.m. on the question of whether or not to ban the ritual slaughter of animals without 
stunning, as currently carried out by Jews and Muslims across much of the world. In 
the early morning hours, the bill to ban slaughter without prior anaesthetisation passed 
with 80% of the House of Representatives behind it. It included a subclause allowing 
religious communities to request an exception, if they could prove scientifically that 
ritually slaughtered animals killed without first being stunned would not suffer more 
than those slaughtered according to the regular procedure. The question of how this 
might be proven remained unclear. If the motion would now also pass the upper chamber 
of Parliament, it would become law, the first time that ritual slaughter would be banned 
in the Netherlands since the country’s occupation by German National Socialists during 
the Second World War.
 Some months later, however, when the issue was debated in the Senate in December, 
the Labour Party (PvdA), the Liberals (VVD) and D66 (Democrats of ’66) – who had 
all supported the ban in the lower chamber – now rejected it, saying they found the 
proposed ban on ritual slaughter too ad hoc, symbolic, unfeasible and a disproportional 
infringement on religious freedom. In addition, a number of Senators found that in 
tackling ritual slaughter, the bill focused on a small problem at the expense of addressing 
the much bigger problem of how to improve animal welfare in regular slaughter 
practices. In other words, for many Senators, the problem of ritual slaughter was ‘the 
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wrong problem’ when it came to the issue of safeguarding animal welfare.1 In response 
to this, the Minister of Agriculture, Henk Bleker (a Christian Democrat), sent a letter 
first to the Senate in December and subsequently to the House of Representatives in 
January 2012 proposing that instead of a legal ban on ritual slaughter, there instead 
should be a covenant – along well-established Dutch consociational lines – in which the 
different parties involved (the state, religious communities and slaughterhouses) would 
come to a formal agreement about ways to minimise the suffering of animals slaughtered 
without stunning.2 The debate in the Senate could not be concluded, however, because 
the politician who had proposed the ban – Marianne Thieme, the leader of the Party 
for the Animals – unexpectedly needed to retire on early pregnancy leave. As it stands, 
a proposal to consider Minister Bleker’s proposal in the House has also been rejected 
until the debate in the Senate is concluded after Representative Thieme returns to work 
in May 2012.
 This initial vote in the Dutch House of Representatives was remarkable for three 
reasons: firstly, it marked a drastic shift in the position of the Labour and Liberal 
political parties who since the Second World War had always staunchly supported ritual 
slaughter against attempts by small conservative Christian and Far Right parties to 
prohibit it. At the same time, all the Christian-identified political parties, some of which 
in the past had supported bans on ritual slaughter, now opposed banning it.3 Secondly, it 
marked the rise of a self-consciously secular majority in Dutch parliamentary politics, 
following the drastic reduction by half of the Christian Democratic Party during the 
last elections in 2010. Unlike the last time this happened, in 1994, however, the secular 
political parties today are extremely polarised between Right and Left. It was all the 
more striking, then, to see secular arch-enemies standing arm-in-arm as it were: the 
progressive Labour, Socialists and Green-Left (GroenLinks) parties uniting with the 
anti-Islamic Party for Freedom (PVV), the Liberals and D66, all against the religious 
parties (including orthodox, centrist and progressive). Bringing to mind for a moment 
the heyday of ‘Purple’ politics – from 1994 to 2002, when for the first time in nearly 
80 years no religious party was included in the reigning coalition – this new alliance 
now sought to continue the trend of secularist legislation that had legalised abortion, 
euthanasia and gay marriage.4 Unlike this earlier legislation, however, the ban on ritual 
slaughter would come at the expense of historical minorities (Jews and Muslims),5 while 
1 This argument was first made by Senator Backer (D66) and then cited by other senators in the course 
of the debate. Handelingen I 2011/12, meeting 12, item 2, at 5-6. See also Handelingen I 2011/12, meeting 
12, item 9.
2 Kamerstukken I 2011/12, 31 571, nr. I and Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 31 571, nr. 21.
3 For a concise overview of political parties’ shifting position on ritual slaughter since the Second 
World War, see B. Wallet, ‘Hoe voor- en tegenstanders van de rituele slacht van rol wisselden’, Trouw 
(14 May 2011) <http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4328/Opinie/article/detail/2428624/2011/05/14/Hoe-voor--en-
tegenstanders-van-de-rituele-slacht-van-rol-wisselden.dhtml>. There is very little public information at 
this moment regarding why precisely the parties in the House of Representatives changed their stances. As 
will be discussed below, the discussion occurred just at the moment that the government was launching a 
new integration policy seeking to privilege Dutch culture as the country’s leading culture, even as Geert 
Wilders was tremendously effective in shifting the terms of the public debates towards an emphasis on 
assimilation (or expulsion) of Muslim immigrants. Crucially, however, this vote split the ruling coalition, 
with the Christian Democrats voting against the ban, even as members of the opposition voted for it. At the 
same time, the parties voting for the ban on ritual slaughter ignored the explicit negative advice of crucial 
elements of their constituencies, leaving the parties themselves highly divided (see n. 6). Correspondingly, 
this shift in the voting pattern of parties seems to have been the result not only of the changing place of 
religion in Dutch society and politics, but also due to a highly contingent combination of circumstances and 
personalities, along with internal party politics, at that very particular moment.
4 Quite strikingly, this parliamentary alliance between parties across the full spectrum from ‘Left’ to 
‘Right’ – ranged against all the religious parties – enacts a strange return to the historical division of the 
Dutch parliament (until 1945) between secular ‘Left’, encompassing Liberals and Socialists, and religious 
‘Right’. In this sense, rather than marking an ‘advance’, the divide between religious and secular parties in 
the debate about ritual slaughter is a return to the Dutch ‘past’. Crucially, the relative position of each is now 
inverted: where once Protestants and Catholics were dominant, now parties without a religious identity are 
in the majority. This divide is not absolute, however: the politicians within the ‘secular’ parties themselves 
have a range of beliefs and identities, including Christian, Jewish, and Muslim.
5 While the Netherlands has incorporated Jews and Muslims for several centuries, their places in the 
Dutch republic, kingdom and historical empire have been very different. In the centuries that the Dutch 
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affirming a secular, techno-scientific norm. Where previous cutting-edge secularist 
legislation had nudged the post-Christian majority to become more inclusive, it now 
would demand of ethno-religious minorities that they submit to majority convictions 
and sensibilities.6
 Last, but not least, this was the first significant success of the new Party for the 
Animals (Partij voor de Dieren), whose entry into the Dutch parliament is itself a first in 
world history. While animal welfare and animal rights are today highly mobilised and 
politicised issues across the world, nowhere else in the world is there a political Party 
for the Animals in parliament itself. Crucially, the leader of the party, Marianne Thieme, 
had been trying for years to generate enough support in Parliament for the prohibition 
of ritual slaughter, until now without success. So the critical shift here was generated 
not so much by the entry of the Party for the Animals into Parliament, but rather by 
Representative Thieme having a bit of good fortune: rather suddenly the major political 
parties found it in their interest to support her proposal, when previously they had 
ignored it. At the same time, there was highly emotional public interest, more extensive 
and more intense than for almost any other political issue that year. The attention this 
generated for the Party for the Animals not only brought extensive media visibility but 
legitimised the party’s position of being the democratic representative of animals.7 This 
party was strengthened measurably – many new members joined – and immeasurably 
in its political prestige.
2 De-Accommodating Religious Minorities
For many, if not most, commentators – academic, public and political – the conflict in this 
case has seemed to be one between religious and secular values and, more specifically, 
the question of on what basis and to what extent divergent religious communities are 
to be accommodated in secular Dutch society and legislation. This would explain the 
clear religious/secular divide within the House of Representatives. Yet, there are a 
laid claim to and controlled the Dutch East Indies, they governed the largest Muslim population in the 
world, making the Netherlands the world’s largest Muslim empire. The current Muslim population in the 
Netherlands, however, arrived subsequent to decolonisation and consists primarily (though not exclusively) 
of immigrants from countries that were not colonised by the Dutch, especially Turkey and Morocco. Jews, 
by contrast, after immigrating from both eastern and southern Europe in different waves, lived for centuries 
‘within’ the Netherlands, as currently defined, as well as travelling to the Dutch colonies as traders and 
settlers. While the Netherlands is deeply committed to remembering the Holocaust, when 90% of Dutch 
Jews were annihilated, Dutch colonialism and the encounter with the Muslim world are largely forgotten and 
in the popular imagination considered to be something located elsewhere, in the past, with little relevance 
for the present. In most cases, this has meant that Jews and Muslims have rarely had shared interests in the 
Netherlands during recent debates – a divergence reinforced by the influence of the Israel–Palestine conflict 
– so the attempt to abolish ritual slaughter marks one further significant moment when assertions of the 
backwardness of religious tradition have been rather suddenly applied with equal force to (orthodox) Jews 
as much as to Muslims.
6 Although, in fact, it is not clear whether indeed it was the desire of the majority of the Dutch population 
that ritual slaughter be banned. The extensive public and political debate indicates that there is little if any 
consensus. At a number of party member meetings, the constituencies of the Labour Party and of D66 
explicitly indicated they wanted their party leadership to reject the bill – suggestions that the party leadership 
ignored – and even among the Liberals (a secularist party of old), there was significant disagreement.
7 By and large, the Party for the Animals does not present itself specifically as ‘representing animals’ 
but rather as a party that seeks to raise the issue of the need for better animal welfare and environmental 
policy. At the same time, the issues foregrounded by the party tend to focus on specific animals – e.g. 
artificially fattened chickens, circus animals, horse mackerel, seals, a captive stork named ‘Freedom’ – the 
cruel conditions of their lives and health and the necessity for ending such cruelty. Voters are encouraged 
to identify with the suffering animals that the party spotlights and/or to take these animals’ interests as their 
own, as a means to getting voters to press for changes in policy. Similarly, during parliamentary debates, 
members of the party have explicitly argued that every animal life counts, a rhetoric that foregrounds 
the individualisation and personification of animals, while pushing the language of policy making to the 
background. Last but not least, the name ‘Party for the Animals’ contains within itself its own ambivalent 
double meaning, in which the distinction between a party representing animal interests and a party seeking 
policies better safeguarding the welfare of animals (while representing the interests of human voters) is 
elided.
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number of important problems with framing the question in this way. The first, and 
most important, is that the issue in this case was not how to accommodate religious 
minorities – religious slaughter, after all, has been recognised by the Dutch government 
since it began to legislate slaughter more generally (except during the Second World 
War) – but rather about whether or not to de-accommodate religious minorities. That 
is, the question was whether or not to curtail state recognition of religious minorities 
and in this way break with Dutch pluralist tradition. Rather than the current form of 
governance that strives to incorporate all religions equally into the public domain while 
maintaining a separation of church and state, a new form of governance was implicated 
– most explicitly by the Party for the Animals, but supported by all the parties voting 
for the bill – in which religion is removed from the public domain, to make way for 
a techno-scientific framework for establishing one collective, national ‘truth regime’ 
and legislating social morality.8 In the first instance, the abolition of ritual slaughter 
would only require invalidating orthodox Jewish and Muslim ‘truth’: that their forms 
of slaughter are equally or more conducive to animal welfare than are regular methods, 
based on science and modern industrial technology. This was effectively accomplished 
by passage of the bill in the House and then turned back by the Senate’s preliminary 
rejection of the bill. At the same time, however, the bill would have helped establish a 
more fundamental distinction between the truth of science and the falsity of religion 
in the public domain. As I will argue in the second half of this article, however, this 
opposition can be maintained only by deploying a dated and unscientific conception of 
religion. Once the most contemporary scientific understanding of religion is considered, 
then any simple opposition between science and religion is drastically compromised. 
Once this happens, negotiating the place of religion in society becomes once again a 
political problem rather than a matter of removing it from the public domain to make 
way for scientistic governance.
3 Accommodating a New Minority
At the same time, the issue of abolishing ritual slaughter was also about how to 
accommodate a new minority: animals. First described as having ‘intrinsic value’ of 
their own in a Dutch government memorandum in 1981 – a conception subsequently 
taken over at the European level – the entry of the Party for the Animals into Parliament 
in 2006 took this idea to a new level by formally constituting animals as beings whose 
interests can be politically represented. In this sense, ‘animals’, already a legal category, 
are becoming a new sociopolitical category. The question is, what kind? Unlike existing 
legislation, the Party for the Animals does not distinguish between the different groups of 
animals it represents – farm animals, laboratory animals, companion animals, wildlife, 
protected and endangered species and so on – all of whom have quite different and 
distinct interests, but (implicitly) claims to speak for all animals. This is only possible, 
one could warrant, because animals cannot speak for themselves and so do not get into 
struggles, as do other minorities, about who can best represent their interests in the 
political domain. Yet, this leads to the strange situation that animals are represented 
by the very group that exploits them: humans. It is as if there were a women’s party 
8 The phrase ‘truth regime’ derives from an interview given by Michel Foucault in 1976. The phrase 
captures usefully the extent to which there is a politics to truth: that which counts as truth is not given 
but emerges out of contests between different subjects/groups/interests proposing different formulae for 
establishing, representing, and acting on that which becomes established as ‘true’. The process of separating 
what is true from what is false is deeply entangled with both particular ways of sanctioning what is true and 
false and of giving status to those speaking what is recognised as truth. In this sense, knowledge is never 
neutral, but social and political. Needless to say, this is a significantly different conception of knowledge 
than that embodied by the ‘scientific expert’ whose authority when advising the government, e.g. depends 
on his ability to satisfactorily establish his neutrality. From the perspective of truth regimes, this neutrality 
is always only apparent. M. Foucault, ‘Entretien avec Michel Foucault’, in Dits et écrits, 1954–1988, vol. 3 
(1977/1994), at 140-160; and ‘Truth and Power’, in J.B. Faubion (ed.), Power in Paul Rabinow (series ed.), 
Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984, vol. 3 (2000), at 111-133. See also, L. Weir, ‘The Concept of Truth 
Regime’, 33 Canadian Journal of Sociology 2, at 367-389 (2008).
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represented by men or a gay party represented by heterosexuals.9 This raises the 
question whether the Party for the Animals does not so much represent the interests of 
animals – who after all remain utterly incapable of understanding or ever participating 
in something called ‘politics’ – as much as the interests of humans who stake political 
claims, publicly identify and position themselves through their concern for animals.10
 The point here is neither purely philosophical nor facetious: instead it emphasises 
the inherent complexity and challenge of democratic representation when those being 
represented are deeply affected by but unalterably outside the political system. The 
Party for the Animals is an attempt to bring animals into the system. This is particularly 
important because the religious minorities affected in this case – Jews and Muslims – do 
not have political representation as such: there are no Jewish or Muslim political parties 
in the Dutch parliament. Nor is there more generally a Party for Religious Minorities, 
much less a Party for the Religious (akin to the Party for the Animals). The question 
then is, lacking such a party, can the interests of Jews and Muslims today be represented 
adequately and, if so, by whom? Furthermore, how can a secular democratic system 
ensure that legislation affecting these unrepresented groups be just and equitable? And 
this brings us back to the question of religious minorities as historical minorities. For, in 
fact, while Jews have been long accommodated to various degrees by Dutch society and 
law, Muslims are a ‘new’ minority within the European (as opposed to imperial Asian, 
African and American) geopolitical boundaries of the Netherlands. To the extent that the 
debate about ritual slaughter has focused on halal slaughter, this is a crucial point. Can 
Muslims, specifically, be accommodated justly by the Dutch system while lacking both 
historical recognition and contemporary political representation as such?
4 Pluralism or Monism?
Crucially, this is a different challenge and question than the one of how to legislate 
pluralism in secular democracy more generally. So while there exist highly subtle, 
thoughtful and productive analyses of how to organise pluralist democracies and 
how to accommodate religious minorities,11 it is not clear that this is in fact the pre-
eminent challenge at hand when it comes to the issue of ritual slaughter. More central 
is the fact that Dutch society and politics today is undecided about whether or not they 
even want to be pluralist, as this entails accommodating and adapting to Islam and to 
immigrants from the Third World. Few, if any, politicians today dare to speak positively 
about multiculturalism, which has officially been declared a ‘failure’. In its place, the 
official vision of the state is that Dutch culture is and must be the ‘leading culture’ 
of the Netherlands.12 A structural contradiction here, however, is made explicit in the 
Memorandum on Integration (Integratie, binding, burgerschap) written by Minister 
9 The most radical in the animal rights movement advocate ending all forms of human possession and 
use of animals. Should this succeed, the result would be to ultimately end the need to represent animals. 
The position of the Party for the Animals is not this absolute, however, blending animal welfare and animal 
rights arguments.
10 This is an important distinction, given how often throughout history the regulation of animal welfare has 
been entangled in quite other political projects, most often attempts to claim control of the public domain, 
to enhance a particular group’s social status and/or to improve the Netherlands’ image internationally. See 
in this regard especially the work of Karel Davids, including Dieren en Nederlanders. Zeven eeuwen lief 
en leed (1989); ‘De zondeval van de dierenbeul. Toelaatbaar en ontoelaatbaar gedrag tegenover dieren 
in Nederland vanaf de late middeleeuwen tot de twintigste eeuw’, in Marijke Gijswijt-Hofstra (ed.), Een 
schijn van verdraagzaamheid. Afwijking en tolerantie in Nederland van de zestiende eeuw tot heden (1989), 
at 237-262; and ‘Dierenbescherming in Nederland vanaf 1864’, 27 Justitiële verkenningen 9, at 10-22 
(2001).
11 See, e.g. the extensive work of Veit Bader, including his Secularism or Democracy? Associational 
Governance of Religious Diversity (2007); W. Connolly, Why I Am Not a Secularist (1999); and G.B. Levey 
and T. Modood (eds.), Secularism, Religion and Multicultural Citizenship (2009).
12 Unfortunately, Dutch politicians have not been able to reach any consensus about what the key 
components of this culture are, even as government memoranda and policies continue to distinguish 
between ‘native Dutch’ and ‘non-Western’ citizens, based on the birthplace of their parents: one non-Western 
parent is technically enough to make any native-born child himself ‘non-Western’. A particularly good 
introduction to the unresolved contradictions of this new vision on Dutch cultural leadership is the debate 
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Donner in June 2011, 6 days before the final debate on ritual slaughter in the House.13 
While Dutch culture is privileged relative to immigrant cultures – immigrants are 
now officially called on to adapt themselves to this ‘leading culture’ – one of the pre-
eminent characteristics of Dutch culture, in that same memorandum, is said to be its 
pluriformity. A crucial component of that pluriformity has been precisely its dynamic 
blend of religious and secular diversity. This is a blend that today is under pressure by, 
among other things, the yearning that it be distilled and solidified into one coherent, 
secular public culture to which all might pledge their allegiance.
 Needless to say, to have the hope and expectation that one’s national culture may 
simultaneously (1) set the parameters for what we all have in common, while also (2) 
encompassing us in all our historical variety, while yet still (3) maintaining a distinction 
between such historical variety and the new variety that has come about through 
immigration, is a hope and expectation that goes far beyond the capacity of any given 
culture. Indeed, it is very much to be questioned whether something like ‘culture,’ which 
is fluid, mobile, contradictory, syncretic, adaptable, conservative and creative, can be 
put to work for the sake of social cohesion and continuity. To legislate culture, without 
transforming it into a state ideology, is impossible. Yet, for the moment there are many 
who have pinned their hopes on Dutch culture as the great equaliser and unifier and 
quite furious has been public anger when that conceit has been questioned, as it was 
with the WRR Report Identificatie met Nederland, brought out in 2007. It seems not 
unlikely, then, that much of the energetic public investment in the debate about ritual 
slaughter – highly disproportional relative to such slaughter’s insignificant role in the 
Dutch meat industry – derives out of the tensions produced by this irreconcilable set of 
overblown desires for ‘Dutch culture’ to solve for us the social and political challenges 
inherent in the multiethnic, multireligious and multinational society that the Netherlands 
has become today.
 At the same time, highly relevant for the debate on ritual slaughter is the fact that 
the nature of (historical) Dutch pluriformity has been changing significantly in recent 
decades, through de-institutionalisation, individualisation and secularisation. In the 
domain of religion, specifically, we see on the one hand a landscape of increasingly 
empty churches and shrinking affiliations with historical religious institutions and life-
worlds. Simultaneously, however, when we look close to the ground at the nature of 
Dutch religious beliefs, identities, spiritualities and ‘life principles’ [levensovertuiging], 
these remain highly fluid, complex and subtle.14 Nonetheless, we see in public debates 
that the strict protection of religious freedom as a constitutional and fundamental human 
right is increasingly being questioned. There is today a significant difference in opinion 
regarding the nature of religion itself: is it a fundamental component of (some) human 
lives and social relations, embedded in and affecting people in their very being? Or is it 
something more comparable to a hobby, a club, an opinion, a style of dress that can be 
slipped on or off at will? Or is religion best conceived as rigid ideology and repressive 
social formation based on irrational, premodern values that are inherently incompatible 
with modern life? While these questions play out most fiercely with regard to Islam, 
they are, at the same time, strongly influencing the Dutch discussion on religion and its 
accommodation more generally.
5 Voluntary vs. Biological Minorities
Indeed, what we see is that with increasing frequency, religion is conceptualised as a 
choice, in distinction from other types of minorities whose condition is conceived as 
congenital and involuntary. A distinction is made between what we might call ‘natural’ 
or ‘biological’ minorities – those who are ‘born that way’ and cannot change their race, 
sex, sexuality or animality (condition of being born an animal) – and those we might call 
in the Parliamentary Committee for Internal Affairs on 29 June 2011 regarding the Annual Memorandum 
on Integration Policy 2007-2011: Be a Part of Society!, see Handelingen II 2010/2011, 31 268, nr. 52.
13 Nota ‘Integratie, binding en burgerschap’ van 16 juni 2011, Kamerstukken II 2010/11, 32 824, nr. 1.
14 W.B.H.J. van de Donk, A.P. Jonkers, G.J. Kronjee and R.J.J. Plum (eds.), Geloven in het publieke 
domein. Verkenningen van een dubbele transformatie (2006).
 Pluralist DeMocracy or scientistic Monocracy? Debating ritual slaughter 33
‘cognitive’ or ‘voluntary’ minorities – those who ‘choose’ to think and act differently, to 
have a different religion or culture. In the case of involuntary minorities, their difference 
is inscribed in their bodies, skin, hair, breasts, genitals, physiology, neurons and DNA. 
In the case of voluntary minorities, by contrast, difference is intangible, fluid and 
changeable. They are not minorities despite themselves but out of belief, conviction, 
feeling, loyalty and decision. These apparently ‘voluntary’ minorities, it is often 
argued, should not have the same rights to recognition and protection as ‘involuntary’ 
minorities: if religious and cultural minorities choose to be different, why should they 
be mollycoddled, given exemptions from general laws, allowed to inconvenience 
society and to put pressure on social norms, political relations and existing legislation? 
Moreover, once there is a conflict between the rights of voluntary and involuntary 
minorities – as, for example, between orthodox religious communities and animals – the 
latter should invariably weigh more heavily. In contrast to the involuntary (biological) 
minorities, religious and cultural minorities (it is said) can adapt to the majority, if only 
they want to.
 This distinction between biological/involuntary and cognitive/voluntary minorities 
is rarely, if ever, spelled out explicitly. It is rather a distillation of the assumptions 
sustaining a number of the debates, arguments and controversies of recent years with 
regard to the rights of religious minorities and the changing place of religion in the 
public domain. Precisely because it has not been named explicitly, the role it plays 
can be at once intangible and subtle, yet potent. When it is combined with an aversion 
to or ignorance about any particular religion or culture, then it begins to edge – and 
at moments falls fully – into discriminatory, undemocratic sensibilities and practices. 
In the rest of this article, it will be argued that this is precisely what happened in the 
course of the campaign by the Party for the Animals to ban ritual slaughter. While since 
the inception of modern democracy, one of the central concerns has been the question 
of how to prevent a ‘tyranny of the majority’, in recent years there has been in the 
Netherlands, among some segments of society and politics, a yearning for just that. The 
legislation proposed by the Party for the Animals – in its non-negotiable absoluteness and 
its moralistic scientism – both strives for and would enable this. This raises the question 
whether a secular majority is any different from any other democratic majority (e.g. 
a religious one). If increasing secularisation in the Netherlands means that increasing 
numbers of people have trouble conceiving of religion as little more than an opinion 
or an ideology – while also increasingly lacking direct, personal experience of religion 
– can such a secular society and its politics truly be tolerant and accommodating of 
religion? Will it not instead almost invariably seek to marginalise, suppress or eliminate 
it, unless itself disciplined by an explicitly pluralist framework?
6 The Anti-Halal Campaign
Beginning with its campaign in 2006 to eliminate the sale of halal meat in Albert Heijn 
grocery stores, the Party for the Animals has been extremely effective in generating 
media attention, intense public emotion and widespread involvement in the issue of 
ritual slaughter. From the moment that it ‘exposed’ the sale of halal meat at more than 
40 Albert Heijn stores, thousands of people responded by writing to Albert Heijn itself; 
expressing their views on Internet forums, in blogs and in columns and entering into 
vigorous, passionate debates.15 This was just at the moment that Geert Wilders was 
15 Albert Heijn itself has felt obliged to open a website dedicated to the topic of halal, explaining its 
basis in the Koran to its customers and outlining the policy and practices of Albert Heijn, <https://www.
ah.nl/klantenservice/veelgesteldevragen/albertheijn/article.jsp?trg=klantenservice/veelgesteldevragen/
albertheijn/article.ah.halal> (last visited 24 February 2012). The irony is that through the Party for the 
Animals’ campaign against ritual slaughter, hundreds of thousands of Dutch consumers have become 
aware of Islamic dietary practices, Islamic traditions and so forth. That is, in its attempt to eradicate ritual 
slaughter, the Party for the Animals has played a significant role in encouraging widespread interest in 
Dutch society in familiarising themselves with core aspects of Islamic tradition and practice. This is all the 
more striking, since roughly 80% of halal slaughter in the Netherlands makes use of (reversible) stunning 
(a figure given by the foundation Halal Correct and accepted within the parliamentary debate).
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rising in the political landscape. Having left the Liberals to become an independent 
Representative, he was now translating this position into a much larger movement that 
was also highly successful at drawing media attention, notably through a fierce and 
insulting anti-Islam rhetoric. A few months later, during the national elections held 
that fall, Geert Wilders’ new Freedom Party would enter Parliament for the first time, 
simultaneous with the Party for the Animals.
 The Party for the Animals regularly mentioned in passing that it wanted to have 
nothing to do with xenophobia and cultural conflict. Yet, when we look at the ways in 
which it publicised its anti-halal campaign, striking overlaps become apparent with the 
language, concepts and logic of Geert Wilders. In late October 2006, the week after 
Albert Heijn announced that it was selling halal meat in 48 stores across the country 
with a significant Muslim customer base, the Party for the Animals went into action, 
launching a campaign to not only have Albert Heijn reverse its decision, but also 
claiming that significant amounts of meat sold by Albert Heijn as unlabelled (‘regular’) 
meat were surplus from halal butchers. According to a public letter by Marianne Thieme 
published at the time, a ‘halal revolution’ was taking place in Dutch slaughterhouses 
‘without consumers being aware of it’.16 With the decision by Albert Heijn to sell 
halal meat, ‘slaughter without anaesthetic has come one step closer to becoming the 
standard procedure’. More generally, recent changes in the law mean that now those 
with a business interest in ritual slaughter ‘can ritually slaughter as much as their heart 
desires’. As a result, we have reached a point where
… as many as 10 imams simultaneously stand beside mechanical slaughter 
belts dedicating the meat to Allah, while the chickens are slaughtered by 
the thousands without anaesthetic.
 Halal has become the new norm at many chicken and cattle farms, 
who want to feed the growing market of 1.5 million Muslims, develop an 
enormous export of halal meat to the whole world and sell the leftovers 
without distinguishing them from regular meat.
 […] Calf slaughterhouses in the ‘Bible Belt’ on the Veluwe, where 
neither owners nor employees normally want to have anything to do with 
Islamic influences, now take on imams without any problem whatsoever, 
in order to dedicate their veal to Allah.17
Thieme’s campaign and language fit smoothly with Wilders’ trope of the creeping, 
invisible Islamisation of the Netherlands. Like Wilders, she presents the accommodation 
of an Islamic practice as opening the door to its hegemonic imposition on all Dutch. 
When we consider the vast disparity between how many animals are actually slaughtered 
by halal methods and those subject to regular slaughter – less than 0.5% of 500 million18 
– it becomes clear that this is an utterly absurd argument. At the same time, Thieme here 
drastically exaggerates the numbers of Muslims living in the Netherlands by inflating 
the official statistic (just under 1 million) by 50%. Her strategic references to ‘Allah’ 
reinforce the sense of this being an alien and exotic practice that has no (normal) place 
in the Christian and post-Christian Dutch landscape: see, she says to prove her point, 
even the most orthodox Christians have capitulated!
 Further on, Thieme enters into theological territory, calling halal slaughter an 
‘excrescence of Muslim tradition’ that ‘creates a distorted image of what Islam as a 
16 M. Thieme, ‘Halal dreigt nieuwe norm Nederlands vlees te worden’, <https://www.partijvoordedieren.
nl/download/halalopinie.pdf>. The website of the Party for the Animals does not have a date for this letter, 
but the earliest public appearance that I can trace is 28 October 2006 in the comments section of a blog on 
news related to the Dutch agrarian sector – see ‘Ritueel slachten is niet zielig’, <http://landbouw.paginablog.
nl/landbouw/2006/10/ritueel_slachten_niet_zielig.html> – 5 days after Thieme and her party launched the 
campaign against the sale of halal meat by Albert Heijn.
17 Id.
18 Foundation Halal Correct, ‘De waarheid achter het ritueel slachten n.a.v. de misleidende beweringen 
van de PvdD’ (14 April 2011), <http://www.halalcorrect.com/publicatie/Reactie_Halal_Correct_PvdD.
pdf>. The statistics given by Halal Correct are based on findings by the PVE (the Dutch Product Boards for 
Livestock, Meat and Eggs Sectors), the foundation Wakker Dier and the VWA (the Netherlands Food and 
Consumer Product Safety Authority).
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worldview has to say about the rights of animals’. She tells her readers that the rules of 
halal slaughter come primarily from tradition rather than the Koran and that Mohammed 
repeatedly prohibited cruelty to animals: ‘shari’a speaks extensively about the rights of 
animals’. Thieme neglects to mention which authorities are her sources, as if shari’a 
were some simple text that anyone can leaf through and reference, rather than a highly 
complex, pluralistic tradition shaped by debate, deliberation and multiple schools of 
interpretation over many centuries. At the same time, the fact that Thieme does not 
mention some of the most important and more recent Islamic decisions on halal slaughter 
– notably by the Muslim World League,19 the Egyptian Fatwa League20 and the Malay 
(and New Zealand) governments – both important international exporters of halal meat21 
and both practising halal slaughter with the use of (reversible) stunning – suggests that 
she is deeply ignorant of actual developments in the Islamic world regarding ritual 
slaughter.22
 Thieme concludes her letter by stating that it is ‘sad to see how the differences between 
social groups are accentuated for economic reasons’, even as some see the ‘commotion 
around ritual slaughter as an opportunity to encourage xenophobic ideas’. She explicitly 
distances the Party for the Animals from such a view: ‘precisely now, when commercial 
interests have gained control of [ritual slaughter] and religion plays a secondary role 
in its practice, there is every reason to intervene for ethical reasons’. Indeed, Thieme 
continues, ‘Increasing numbers of Muslims are advocating a decreased consumption of 
animal products and the introduction of stunning during the slaughter process. This plea 
must be reinforced …’ Suddenly, from the beginning of the paragraph to its conclusion, 
Thieme’s argument has undergone a striking reversal. If at the beginning, intervention 
was especially required because halal slaughter had been co-opted by a profit-hungry, 
immoral meat industry that has deprived it of most of its religious dimension, by the end 
19 The Muslim World League is a member of the United Nations, UNESCO and UNICEF. In January 
1986, it held a joint meeting with the World Health Organization (WHO) and made the following official 
‘Recommendation’ about pre-slaughter stunning (No. 3:1. WHO-EM/FOS/1-E, at 8): ‘Pre-slaughter 
stunning by electric shock, if proven to lessen the animal’s suffering, is lawful, provided that it is carried 
out with the weakest electric current that directly renders the animal unconscious, and that it neither leads to 
the animal’s death nor renders its meat harmful to the consumer’. (Report of meeting of Joint Committee of 
the League of the Muslim World and the World Health Organisation at the Institute of Veterinary Medicine 
in West Berlin from 30 June to 3 July 1986, No. 3:1. WHO-EM/FOS/1-E, at 8).
20 Egyptian Fatwa Committee, 18th December 1978: ‘If the electro narcosis of the animal or any other 
anaesthetic procedure helps bleed the animal while weakening its resistance during the bleeding, and if this 
electro narcosis has no effect on its life (i.e. to say, if the animal comes back to normal life if the bleeding 
does not take place) it is allowed to resort to electro narcosis or any other similar type of anaesthetic 
procedure before the bleeding. The meat of the animal bled in that way is licit’. See Al-fatawi al-islamiyyah 
min dar al-ifta al-masriyyah, vol. 10, fatwa No. 1295, at 3548-3549. While this excerpt from the fatwa is 
widely cited across the English-language Internet, the only reference in a publication in a European language 
to the original Arab-language text that I could find is in an English translation of the originally French 
article by S.A. Aldeeb Abu-Sahlieh, ‘Les minorities en Suisse: Cas des musulmans’, XVIth Congress of 
the International Academy of Comparative Law, Brisbane, Australia (July 2002), The Rights of Indigenous 
and Minority Peoples Section <http://courseweb.edteched.uottawa.ca/IACLindigenousminorityrights/
SwissReport.pdf> (last visited 2 February 2012).
21 Department of Islamic Development Malaysia, Malaysian Protocol for the Halal Meat and Poultry 
Productions (4 April 2011), Section 4.5.1 ‘Stunning’, at 7-8. New Zealand has long been an exporter 
of halal meat to Malaysia (though disrupted by a recently settled 6-year disagreement between the two 
countries over aspects of halal slaughter), while in 2011 New Zealand’s Agriculture and Forestry Ministry 
won the award for best service provider at the World Halal Forum. New Zealand’s success, as in the case 
of all success within the global halal market, depends on effectively combining the most advanced methods 
of packaging, branding, advertising and networking with consistent supply chains and quality control. In 
other words, success within the global Islamic market requires a commitment not so much to Islam per se 
as to the most modern business methods capable of persuading customers across great distances to trust that 
products are what they say they are.
22 The alternative interpretation – that Thieme is aware of these but neglects to mention them in order 
to strengthen her portrayal of halal slaughter as the product of age-old tradition impervious to modern, 
scientific thought and new technologies – the better to rally a Dutch constituency that knows even less than 
she does – would be a more Machiavellian reading. On the integration of halal slaughter with the newest 
technological apps in Malaysia, see S.N. Junaini and J. Abdullah, ‘MyMobiHalal 2.0: Malaysian Mobile 
Halal Product Verification Using Camera Phone Barcode Scanning and MMS’, International Conference 
on Computer and Communication Engineering 2008 (Kuala Lumpur, 13-15 May 2008), at 528-532.
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intervention entails lending support to Muslims who themselves are calling for the use 
of anaesthetic during slaughter. The halal slaughter, which just a few paragraphs earlier, 
was an excrescence of Islamic tradition, now instead needs to be reclaimed from the 
meat industry by ethical Muslims and their supporters.
 Thieme here returns to an idea she launched earlier in the letter, namely that the 
cause of the growth of halal slaughter is that the meat industry is taking advantage of a 
change in law that has made it easier to choose this process. Similarly, she has argued 
that the only reason why orthodox Christian butchers might include such possibilities in 
their slaughterhouses is the lure of money:
What were once called ‘principles’ are sacrificed without problem at the 
altar of the economy. Not out of any increased appreciation for Islamic 
faith, but because it enables trade and an increase in profit because of the 
less strict rules of halal slaughter.23
As throughout much of the letter, Thieme’s argument here has the feel of convenience 
rather than fact. To suggest that Protestant butchers who incorporate halal slaughter 
into their business lack principles is a rather drastic accusation, not likely to persuade 
the butchers themselves to reconsider. Why or how halal slaughter might be cheaper 
is unclear. Halal slaughter, after all, has extensive rules regarding the restraining of 
animals during slaughter, the types and number of cuts used to kill an animal and so 
on. That is, though the rules themselves are different, it is as rule-bound – as ‘strict’ 
in Thieme’s framework – as regular slaughter. In a pattern that she repeats during the 
parliamentary debates, Thieme here imputes the worst to those who act differently from 
the way she would like: halal-friendly butchers are money-grubbing hypocrites.
 Although certainly an attempt to distance itself from the xenophobic anti-Islamism 
of the Freedom Party, the rather illogical conclusion jars with the general Islam-critical 
tenor and title of the rest of the piece. The letter as a whole – a jittery mosaic of diverse 
arguments – shows Thieme searching for the right discursive and moral register. And 
it confirms that leading up to the parliamentary debates, she has been aware of the 
xenophobic elements of the anti-halal voices sweeping through the Netherlands.24 This 
is not a sufficient incentive, however, to change her argument or her approach. Indeed 
by late 2011, when making her arguments in Parliament, all mention of commercial 
interests have fallen by the wayside. Most likely this is both because the meat industry 
failed to mobilise in any significant fashion on behalf of halal slaughter, even as cruel 
and illegal conditions in the meat industry fail to rally voters, politicians and the media 
with the same comprehensive intensity as the issue of religious slaughter does.25 
Ritual slaughter has become a national issue, while conditions in the meat industry 
more generally, despite their much greater scope, remain a special interest. So it is 
the religious nature of ritual slaughter, particularly in its Islamic variant, that enables 
23 Thieme, above n.16.
24 For typical elaborations on Thieme’s argument following the launch of her party’s campaign against 
the sale of halal meat, which reinforce the anti-Islamic, anti-immigrant tone, see the column by Gerry van 
der List, ‘De halalisering van Holland’, on the website of the well-known magazine Elsevier (25 October 
2006) <http://www.elsevier.nl/web/Opinie/Commentaren/97324/De-halalisering-van-Holland.htm> and 
the article – including an exchange of letters with Albert Heijn – placed by Joost Niemoller on a site 
hospitable to people who explicitly identify with the PVV, De dagelijkse standaard, ‘Bij Albert Heijn veel 
meer halal dan u denkt’, (16 December 2010) <http://www.dagelijksestandaard.nl/2010/12/bij-albert-heijn-
is-veel-meer-halal-dan-u-denkt/>.
25 See, e.g. the parliamentary discussion of the budget for the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture 
and Innovation held in November 2010. Here Representative Thieme quite firmly expresses her impatience 
with the fact that laws passed and agreements made regarding the welfare of animals in the meat industry 
continue to be violated for years on end without serious consequences. Farmers still chop off the tails of 
pigs and the beaks of chickens even though the former has now been illegal for 14 years, while more than 
10 years earlier, agreements were made with chicken farmers to end the latter, but chicken farmers have 
yet to stop the practice. Given the size of the pig and poultry industries, the actual amount of suffering 
these practices cause pigs and chickens must be huge. Yet, any visible social or political unrest, much less 
mobilisation and heated public debate about them, remains completely absent. Handelingen II 2010/2011, 
nr. 26, at 66-128.
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the issue of animal welfare to suddenly feel much more ‘immediate’ and of particular, 
personal concern to many Dutch, while the suffering of animals more generally does 
not.
7 Religion vs. Science?
The Party for the Animals remained responsive to this. In late 2010, the week before 
their proposed bill was to be debated for the first time in Parliament, they screened a 
film in the House combining undercover film clips of ritual slaughter with statements by 
scientists critical of ritual slaughter. The images of dying animals shown are graphic and 
visceral, sure to disturb, perhaps even overwhelm, the viewer. The rational commentary 
and criticism of the scientists stands in sharp contrast to these images of violence.26 
Throughout the ensuing debates in the House, Representative Thieme and other 
members of the Party for the Animals would continue to juxtapose and press this contrast 
between (harmful) religion and (rational) science. Sustained by the absolute conviction 
that ritual slaughter ‘is literally not of this time’27 and that the scientific evidence is 
incontrovertible, the stance of the Party was absolute and non-negotiable. A proposal 
from the Representative Dijkgraaf (Orthodox Protestant Party (SGP)) that would have 
eliminated 99.5% of current ritual slaughter without stunning in the Netherlands was 
still unacceptable to the Party for the Animals: every single animal that suffers is one too 
many Thieme emphasised at different times: ‘everyone should be equal before the law 
… for an animal in the Netherlands it should not make any difference what the religion 
of the butcher is, whether he’s Jewish, Islamic, Christian or secular’.28 The imperative 
that no animal be harmed through ritual slaughter was absolute: the imperative that 
religious freedom is a human right was relative.
 Time and again during the debate in the House, the representatives of the Party for 
the Animals were probed regarding their concern with taking the interests of religious 
minorities into account. In fact, the Party for the Animals showed little, if any, concern 
with engaging the difficult question of how best to safeguard freedom of religion as a 
human right. As far as the party’s arguments were concerned, freedom of religion was a 
non-issue relative to animal suffering. Thieme’s motto, repeated through the years, was 
repeated here too: the rights of religious freedom end when religion harms another. Thieme 
here speaks without making a distinction between human and animal subjects. At the 
same time, Representative Thieme argues that the prohibition on ritual slaughter would 
only marginally affect the freedom of religion.29 In order to make this point, she presents 
the purpose of religious slaughter as being primarily hygienic and animal friendly: to 
drain the slaughtered animal quickly and efficiently of blood, while safeguarding its 
welfare as much as possible. What utterly disappears in this account is the theological 
significance of slaughter as an expression and enactment of the relation of the human 
to the divine, the divine imperative to respect life and so forth. Correspondingly, the 
26 For a number of commentators the film brings to mind Wilder’s earlier controversial film Fitna (which 
likewise consisted of a montage of violent images combined with highly rational, cool statistics, the better 
to reach and persuade its audience of the dangers of Islam and Muslim immigrants). According to the 
website of the foundation Halal Correct (whose main task is halal quality control and certification), the 
name of the anti-ritual slaughter film when it was shown in the House was ‘Fitna Animal’ at the time of its 
screening: see ‘De waarheid achter het ritueel slachten n.a.v. de misleidende beweringen van de PvdD’ (14 
April 2011), <http://www.halalcorrect.com/publicatie/Reactie_Halal_Correct_PvdD.pdf>. If this is correct, 
the significance of this title in relation to the use of other aspects of Wilder’s style by the Party for the 
Animals is remarkable. There is, however, no further trace of this title to be found either on the Internet or in 
the Dutch newspaper archives. For others, the film recalled the images from Jewish slaughterhouses used in 
the Nazi film Der ewige Jude to persuade its audience of the barbarity of Jews. As was many times pointed 
out, there is a long history of a close relationship between anti-Semitism and the prohibition or repudiation 
of ritual slaughter. Central as this is to the issue as a whole, I cannot address it here, owing to constraints of 
space.
27 Representative Thieme, Handelingen II 2011/12, 31 571, item 16, at 137.
28 Id., item 2, at 7.
29 Id., item 2, at 12, 15.
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only way in which Representative Thieme could essentially understand the continued 
resistance of religious communities to her bill was by imagining that it was a matter not 
so much of religious freedom as of their ego being hurt:
At the same time – I find it very important to make this clear – I really do 
understand that it affects people deeply. If for more than 3,000 years you 
have been of the opinion that you are doing the very best that can be done 
for animals, your surroundings, your fellow man and yourself, and you 
are [then] confronted with scientific reports that make clear that you’ve 
actually acted wrongly, then that’s terrible to find out.30
In other words, Representative Thieme can only conceive of the resistance and distress 
of the religious community as being the result of their coming to terms with how right 
she is. This trope – the shock of the religious believer in the face of scientific truth – is, 
however, strikingly clichéd, dated and utterly tone deaf to the sensibilities, concerns and 
convictions of those disagreeing with her from a religious standpoint, whether Jewish, 
Muslim or Christian. Some of these interlocutors repeatedly emphasised their sense 
that there need be little conflict between religion and science, a point she consistently 
ignored.31
8 The Science of Religion
Correspondingly, to many commentators the issue of ritual slaughter has seemed like 
an extension or variation on the conflict between religion and secularism, in which 
religious truth based on divine revelation and social tradition is in conflict with scientific 
truth based on empirical research. The notion that this is what was at stake in the 
debate on ritual slaughter is deeply misleading, however. While scientific and religious 
traditions for establishing what is ‘true’ vary significantly on certain points (notably the 
relevance or irrelevance of divine revelation), this has not prevented extensive scientific 
research on religion. Originally this research was primarily historical, sociological 
and anthropological, but the technological innovations of the last decades have also 
enabled research on the biology and physiology of religion: the ways in which religion 
is (possibly) a product of human evolution,32 religion’s measurable physiology in 
the human body and its transformation of the human brain.33 That is to say, the same 
30 Id., item 16, at 141.
31 See, in particular, the exchanges between Representative Thieme and Representative Wiegman-van 
Meppelen Scheppink (Christen Unie), Handelingen II 2011/12, 31 571, item 16, at 140. Representatives from 
other religious parties also at various moments qualify or express their scepticism towards Representative 
Thieme’s conception of religion in relation to science. This point is all the more striking, given the recent 
controversy that erupted when it was made public that Marianne Thieme had recently become a Seventh 
Day Adventist. Some of her most prominent public backers felt deeply misled when they discovered her 
religious convictions. This adds a further layer of complexity to the whole issue that unfortunately cannot 
be addressed here for lack of space. My thanks to Peter Geschiere for pointing this out. See, among others, 
M. ‘t Hart, ‘De zondeval van Marianne Thieme’, <www.nrc.nl/opinie/article1786905.ece/De_zondeval_
van_Thieme> (last visited 10 February 2012).
32 For a variety of approaches to this topic, see N. Wade, The Faith Instinct: How Religion Evolves and Why 
It Endures (2009); R.N. Bellah, Religion in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age (2011), 
especially Ch. 2 ‘Religion and Evolution’, at 44-116; R. Wright, The Evolution of God (2009); D.S. Wilson, 
Darwin’s Cathedral: Evolution, Religion and the Nature of Society (2003); T. Deacon and T. Cashman, 
‘The Role of Symbolic Capacity in the Origin of Religion’, 3 Journal for the Study of Religion, Nature and 
Culture, at 490-517 (2009); P. Boyer, Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought 
(2001); S. Atran, In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion (2002); and D.H. Hamer, The 
God Gene: How Faith Is Hardwired into Our Genes (2004). See also M. Midgley, Evolution as a Religion 
(1985/2006) for a subtle discussion of the overlap between religious and evolutionary thought.
33 For an accessible discussion, see the Pew Forum ‘How Our Brains Are Wired for Belief’ (5 May 2008) 
in which Andrew Newberg, a radiologist at the University of Pennsylvania, shows brain scans correlated 
with different forms of religious activity, <http://www.pewforum.org/Science-and-Bioethics/How-Our-
Brains-are-Wired-for-Belief.aspx>. For a more wide-ranging discussion, see the extended Pew Forum 
‘Religion and Science: Conflict or Harmony?’ held 1 year later (4 May 2009) <http://www.pewforum.org/
Science-and-Bioethics/Religion-and-Science-Conflict-or-Harmony.aspx#7>.
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technology that allows scientists today to measure animal suffering with ever greater 
precision is also allowing scientists to measure the biology and physiology of human 
religion with ever greater precision.
 While the research results of the former were extensively drawn upon and discussed 
during the parliamentary debate, the research results of the latter were completely 
absent. This is quite understandable in terms of how historically and by convention 
today politicians and Dutch society more generally are used to understanding religion 
as a matter of belief that is translated into particular practices and rules for living. From 
within the framework of a scientific worldview, however, which by necessity must take 
recent neurological, radiological and evolutionary science seriously, this conception of 
religion can only be considered fundamentally dated. Correspondingly, the recurring 
juxtaposition of religion as first and foremost a tradition, an opinion, or a deep moral 
sensibility in contrast to animal slaughter as a physical process is by definition not only 
unscientific but also highly ideological. From within the framework of science itself 
religion is as deeply biological and empirically measurable as is animal physiology: 
religion is as ‘true’ (i.e. empirically measurable) as is the body of an animal.34
9 Are Religious Minorities ‘Biological’ Minorities After All?
It may seem that this issue is relatively far removed from the question of how to 
accommodate religious minorities in secular democracies. In fact, it is central – or at 
least, this issue is made central – the moment that the ultimate measure for establishing 
truth and framing our deliberations on just law becomes empirical science. If science 
becomes the empirical base for establishing moral truth – as it did in this case – then it 
is bad reasoning and bad politics to take into account the biology of animal suffering 
without taking seriously the biology of human religion. Certainly, from a religious 
point of view, this argument goes against deeply ingrained religious conventions for 
considering religion as divine revelation, embodied in canonical texts, traditions, 
practices and relations. At the same time, it goes against just as deeply ingrained 
secularist conventions for considering religion as a product of purely social relations, 
a human invention, even a figment of the human imagination. In both cases, much of 
this view of religion is in fact one inherited from the 19th century and, as such, deeply 
behind the (scientific) times. The consequence, however, of taking this research into 
account is quite significant. Most importantly, one could imagine that it would make 
it possible to argue that religious believers are as much ‘congenital’ or ‘biological’ or 
‘involuntary’ minorities as are racial, gendered and sexual minorities. At the same time, 
it raises the possibility that infringement on existing religious freedoms and religious 
practices, as these are tied to religious sensibilities deeply embedded in human brains, 
bodies and even DNA, can be not just emotionally unsettling but disruptive of religious 
lives in fundamental biological ways. As far as I know, this has not yet been researched. 
Yet, given the significant truth value assigned to the embodiment of difference and 
to physical suffering in cases that require weighing conflicting rights and given the 
argument that scientific evidence is a crucial measure of both difference and suffering 
(as it was here), then under such conditions the legislative and political process would 
seem to require that the physicality of religion must also be taken into account.
 Crucially, such a ‘scientific’ approach recognising that religion is as much a 
physiological process as are animal pain and fear, does not resolve the issue of how 
to balance religious freedom and animal welfare. What it does do is even the playing 
field. Rather than religion being seen as first and foremost a belief, an opinion, a cultural 
inheritance or an ideology – a kind of mental accessory – in contrast to the fundamental, 
actual and true suffering of animals, religion as physical experience is framed as equally 
fundamental and true from the perspective of science. Once that is the case, no one party 
34 At the same time, of course, certain assertions of the inherent value of animal life and welfare can 
become deeply ‘religious’ in their formulations of the intimate continuity between human and animal life, 
even as quite often these perceptions are informed by the sensibilities and values of diverse religious and 
spiritual traditions.
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would have either moral or biological truth solely on their side and it would become 
necessary once again for all sides to negotiate in order for an equitable solution to 
be realised. Notably, none of the political parties have attempted this: the notion that 
religion is first and foremost a matter of belief and tradition is too strong, even as for the 
religious parties the possibility that religion may originate in biology rather than divine 
revelation could be highly problematic, at least initially.35
10 In Conclusion: a Quick Look across the Border
Even as new technology, liberalisation and immigration are visibly transforming Dutch 
society before our very eyes, the institutions, categories and political processes that we 
have are derived from other times and other challenges. What are church-state relations 
when ‘church’ no longer has the social, emotional and political centrality it once did or 
does not exist for religious communities such as Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists? How 
can we rethink the place of religion in society and politics if religion turns out to be less 
a matter of faith and more a matter of genes and evolution? And how do the politics of 
secularism change once secularism becomes hegemonic? This article has only been able 
to touch on these issues in the interest of reframing the debate on ritual slaughter. Rather 
than – or more than – a conflict between religious and secular values, or between religious 
and animal rights, it foregrounds the tension in the Netherlands between responding 
to contemporary challenges through a pluralist or a monist framework. Certainly the 
monism proposed until now – with Dutch culture as ‘leading culture’ and science as 
pre-eminent framework for truth – would appear to offer the possibility of coherence 
and unity. Yet, as they stand, both are too superficial to clear the tasks given them: Dutch 
culture is too variegated and indistinct to serve as an unifying centre, and science raises 
as many problems as it solves once it is applied consistently. As a particular method of 
truth finding, science itself has no social and political values and can be made to serve 
all interests, positions and projects.36 So, in closing, I would like to briefly mention 
instead an alternative from our neighbours next door: the German Greens.37
 The German Greens emerged simultaneously with the very visible politicisation 
of the issue of religious slaughter in Germany in the 1980s.38 Beginning from a 
position opposed to religious slaughter, but highly conscious of the anti-Semitic, racist 
overtones and xenophobic rhetoric in which it was implicated, they took their time 
coming to a formal position. Both from animal welfare groups outside the party and 
from individuals and working groups inside, there was pressure to take a stand against 
religious slaughter. As in the Netherlands today, there were those in Germany then who 
argued that it was necessary to achieve cultural homogeneity and that those immigrants 
who hoped to integrate needed to renounce foreign traditions at odds with modern 
German ethical norms. Others argued from the position of animal rights themselves. 
35 The notion of religious minorities using biological arguments to gain credence, social recognition and 
political capital is not as far-fetched as it might seem: this would only be to follow in the footsteps of gay 
rights movements which have often argued that homosexuality is a matter of biology rather than choice or 
morality, precisely in order to both naturalise homosexuality and make successful claims to accommodation.
36 This is the fundamental issue Zygmunt Bauman asks us to grapple with in his Modernity and the 
Holocaust (1989): that the Holocaust was not a failure of modernity, but a product of modern science, 
technology and bureaucracy.
37 A second alternative, which would take us too far afield to consider here, concerns a proposal by the 
well-known American jurists Cass Sunstein and Jeff Leslie. They argue that the most pressing problem 
today are not the differences between moral communities but rather the vast gap between the values people 
hold – virtually all of whom would like to limit animal suffering – and their possibility for acting on these 
values, because existing markets do not disclose the relevant treatment of animals. Correspondingly, they 
propose a ‘regime of disclosure’ – clearly labelling all food according to how the animals used to produce 
it were treated – that would enable consumers to choose what kind of animal treatment they do and do not 
support. No consensus would be reached, but people as a whole would be able much more effectively to act 
on their moral beliefs than they can today. ‘Animal Rights without Controversy’, 70 Law and Contemporary 
Problems, at 117-138 (2007).
38 This account is based on the excellent article by D. Smith, ‘“Cruelty of the Worst Kind”: Religious 
Slaughter, Xenophobia, and the German Greens’, 40 Central European History, at 89-115 (2007).
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And as in the Netherlands, the issue of animal suffering was an issue with tremendous 
public resonance. Significantly, however, the German Greens were concerned not only 
with environmental issues, but also with issues of immigration and democracy. In fact, 
they have been the only political party to consistently push for direct and easy extension 
of citizenship to foreigners. This was ultimately decisive in shaping their decision in 
1990 not to support attempts to ban ritual slaughter: ‘we do not wish to force anyone to 
live like us’. In 2002, when ritual slaughter was once again permitted in Germany, they 
reaffirmed their commitment to this position.
 More important than the particular position that the German Greens took are three 
points: firstly, they took the necessary time – nearly a decade – to think and work through 
the issue before coming to a definitive standpoint. Correspondingly, their position was 
based on extensive knowledge, reflection, internal and external debate rather than on 
the reactive and opportunistic imperatives of parliamentary politics. Secondly, from 
the beginning they took seriously the long history and current entanglement of popular 
opposition to ritual slaughter with ideologies of xenophobia, anti-Islamism and anti-
Semitism. Rather than simply repudiating any association with these – while at moments 
taking on some of their rhetorical style and discourse – the German Greens seriously 
addressed the consequences of this entanglement. Thirdly, this led them to take up an 
anti-hegemonic, pluralist position that rejected the possibility and ideal of imposing 
their way of life on others, even after the German Leitkultur debate exploded in the late 
1990s. As such, the German Greens offer a critical contrast to the Party for the Animals, 
which in privileging the interests of animals (as they conceive them) above all else have 
been willing to flirt with an Islamophobic politics that here follows in the footsteps of 
modern anti-Semitism while seeking to impose their way of life on others unconvinced 
of its merits but lacking the democratic representation to challenge the Party for the 
Animals effectively.
